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ABSTRACT
Analysis of Encrypted Malicious Traffic
by Anish Singh Shekhawat
In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in the number of malware
attacks that use encrypted HTTP traffic for self-propagation and communication.
Due to the volume of legitimate encrypted data, encrypted malicious traffic resembles
benign traffic. As the malicious traffic is similar to benign traffic, it poses a challenge
for antivirus software and firewalls. Since antivirus software and firewalls will not
typically have access to encryption keys, detection techniques are needed that do not
require decrypting the traffic. In this research, we apply a variety of machine learning
techniques to the problem of distinguishing malicious encrypted HTTP traffic from
benign encrypted traffic.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Mark Stamp, for
his encouragement, patience, and continuous guidance throughout my project and
graduate studies as well. I would also like thank my committee members Dr. Katerina
Potika and Fabio Di Troia for reviewing my work and providing valuable feedback.
I am also grateful to my family and friends who have supported me throughout
the course of my Masters program.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

3 Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

3.1

Data Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

3.2

Feature Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

3.3

Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

3.4

Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

4 Methodolgy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

4.1

Machine Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

4.1.1

Support Vector Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

4.1.2

Random Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

4.1.3

XGBoost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

4.1.4

Cross-Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

Evaluation Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

5 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

4.2

5.1

Training Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

5.2

Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

5.3

K-means Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

5.4

Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

5.4.1

24

SVM with 10-fold cross validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
vi

5.4.2

SVM with different kernels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

5.4.3

Univariate Feature Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

5.4.4

SVM with Recursive Feature Elimination . . . . . . . . . .

26

5.4.5

Random Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

5.4.6

XGBoost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

5.4.7

Classification based on malware family . . . . . . . . . . .

30

Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

6 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

5.5

6.1

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

6.2

Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41

vii

LIST OF TABLES

1

Dataset Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

2

Extracted features from conn.log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

3

Extracted Features from ssl.log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

4

Extracted Features from x509.log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

5

Top Five Ports Used by ORIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

6

Top Five Ports Used by RESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

7

Top 20 Feature ranks by SVM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

8

Malware Family Dataset

32

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

1

Interconnection of log records using unique keys in Bro . . . . . .

8

2

SVM hyperplane and support vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

3

SVM maps input data to feature space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

4

Random Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

5

10-fold cross-validation. The red rectangle is the testing set and the
other subsets are used for training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

6

Frequency of ports used by ORIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

7

Frequency of ports used by RESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

8

Original Scatter Plot vs K-means clustering . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

9

Original Scatter Plots with different axes . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

10

SVM with 10-fold cross-validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

11

Weights assigned to features by SVM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

12

SVM with different kernels

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

13

Weights assigned to the features by SVM and UFE . . . . . . . .

28

14

Recursive Feature Elimination with SVM . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

15

Recursive Feature Elimination with Random Forest . . . . . . . .

30

16

Random Forest feature importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

17

Random Forest with different number of estimators . . . . . . . .

32

18

XGBoost with Recursive Feature Elimination . . . . . . . . . . .

33

19

XGBoost feature importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

20

XGBoost with different number of estimators . . . . . . . . . . .

35

ix

21

Performance comparison of the three machine learning algorithms

35

22

Performance comparison of the three machine learning algorithms
for malware family based classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

23

Performance comparison of the three machine learning algorithms
for multi-class problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

24

Comparison of various machine learning algorithms . . . . . . . .

37

25

Feature correlation heat map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

x

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware is, arguably, the greatest threat to information security today. Malware,
short for malicious software is a computer program designed to infiltrate and damage
or disable computer systems without the user’s consent [1]. These malicious programs
often communicate with a command and control (C&C) server to fetch commands
from an attacker. According to Malwarebytes, a popular cybersecurity product, over
90% of small-to-medium sized businesses (SMB) have experienced an increase in the
number of malware detection---some businesses experienced an increase of 500% in
March 2017 alone [2]. Real-time malware detection using network traffic information
has the potential to prevent---or at least greatly reduce---malware propagation on the
network.
One approach to detect network traffic is to use deep packet inspection for
investigating the contents and intent of the network traffic. Such techniques aggregate
successive packets that have the same protocol type and same source and destination
port and address. They then analyze the contents of these aggregated packets and
check for signatures that have been previously discovered to classify the source as
malicious or benign [3].
Unfortunately, due to the widespread use of the HyperText Transfer Protocol
Secure (HTTPS), or HTTP over Secure Socket Layer (SSL), such deep packet inspection methods can be inadequate to classify the network traffic. HTTPS is a secure
communication protocol and, according to Google, more than 70% of internet traffic
is using HTTPS to communicate over the Internet [4].
HTTPS is, essentially, HTTP using either the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or
Transport Layer Security (TLS). Unencrypted traffic is exposed and can be read
by anyone who can intercept the traffic packets. As everyday objects become more
1

digital, many software applications and internet connected devices use encryption
as their primary method to protect privacy, secure communications and maintain
trust over the Internet. As a result, the rise in encrypted network traffic has affected
the cybersecurity landscape. Malware can also leverage encryption by using it to
evade detection and hide malicious activities. CISCO released a report [5] which
states that although a majority of malware do not encrypt their network traffic, there
is a steady 10% to12% increase annually in malicious network traffic that encrypt
their communication using HTTPS. The 2017 Global Application & Network Security
Report from Radware [6], a leading cyber security and application delivery firm, states
that 35% of the organizations in their global security survey faced TLS or SSL based
attacks, which represents an increase of 50% over the previous year.
The main purpose of this research is to analyze whether we can effectively
distinguish encrypted malicious network traffic from encrypted benign traffic, without
decrypting. This paper is focused on the use of machine learning as a possible solution
to this problem. Specifically, we use machine learning to analyze encrypted network
traffic based on a wide variety of unencrypted information, such as connection duration,
source and destination ports and IP addresses, SSL certificate key lengths, and so on.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a basic
overview of previous work related to the problem of detecting malicious traffic. In
Chapter 3, we discuss the datasets used in our experiments. Chapter 4, discusses
the proposed methodology. Chapter 5 gives our experimental results and analysis.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we give our conclusion and briefly discuss future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Related Work
Traditional malicious network communication techniques rely either on portbased classification or deep packet inspection and signature matching techniques.
Port-based methods rely on inspection of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) port numbers [7] and assumption that applications
always use well-known port numbers that are registered by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) [8]. Dreger and Feldmann in [9] showed that malicious
applications use non-standard ports to evade network intrusion detection systems
(NIDS) and restricting firewalls. Even prominent applications such as Skype use
dynamic port numbers to escape restrictive firewalls [10]. Madhukar and Williamson
in [11] showed that port-based classification mis-classifies network flow traffic 30-70%
of the time.
Etienne in [12] used deep packet inspection to detect malicious traffic by inspecting payload contents and using traditional pattern matching or signature based
techniques. Etienne used Snort [13], an intrusion detection application, to detect
malicious traffic using signature or string matching on the packet contents. Snort
also hosts a popular Intrusion Protection System (IPS) rule set maintained by the
community [14]. But only around 1 % of the rule set are TLS specific which shows that
traditional pattern matching techniques are not used often for TLS based malware.
Sen et al. [3] demonstrates the use of deep packet inspection to reduce false positive
and false negative rates by 5% when classifying Peer-to-Peer (P2P) traffic. Moore and
Papagiannaki in [15] achieved a 100% accuracy when identifying network applications
using the entire packet payload. The primary limitations of these methods are the
invasion of user privacy and the huge overhead of decrypting and analyzing each
packet.
3

Tegeler et al. in [16] presented BotFinder, a network-flow information based
system to detect bot infections. The system uses a sequence of chronologically-ordered
flow called traces to find irregularities in the network behavior between two endpoints.
This along with other network metadata such as average time interval, averaged
duration, average number of source and destination bytes, etc. were used as features
in a local shrinking based clustering algorithm [17]. Prasse et al. in [18] derived a
neural network based malware detection using network flow features such as port
value, connection duration, number of bytes sent and received, time interval between
packets and domain name features. We do not use domain name features or Domain
Name System (DNS) data as features due to the introduction of DNS over TLS where
the DNS data is also encrypted using TLS [19]. Lokoč et al. in [20] presented a k-NN
based classification technique that could identify servers contacted by malware using
HTTPS traffic.
Anderson and McGrew in [21] proposed a new technique that analyzed network
flow metadata and applied supervised machine learning algorithms to identify encrypted malware traffic. They used a demilitarized zone (DMZ), to collect and train
the machine learning algorithm on the benign network traffic. DMZ is a sub-network
that separates the externally connected services from internal systems. Externally
connected services are those which connect to the internet to provide various services.
As it was based on supervised learning models, it provided results which can be
easily interpreted [22]. The machine learning model helped in high-speed processing
of the network traffic and real-time predictions. It also leveraged regularization, an
important part of training, to select features that are most discriminatory [23]. Since
the DMZ segregates such services and is used only in business organizations, the
network traffic data collected by them is not an actual representation of the general
network traffic. Since this data represents only enterprise users, i.e. those who work
4

in business organizations, the results may not hold for general internet users such as
students or home users as mentioned in [21].
This paper further explores the use of various network flow information as features
to train machine learning algorithms. These features are obtained without decrypting
any packets in the network flow. The paper also explores the use of these features to
classify malicious traffic based on malware family and discussed the importance of
these features using various machine algorithms algorithms.

5

CHAPTER 3
Dataset
One of the most important step of a machine learning design methodology is
the collection of dataset that represents the problem we wish to solve. We used two
popular and published network capture dataset that contains malware and benign
traffic.
• CTU-13 Dataset [24]
The CTU-13 dataset was captured in the Czech Technical University, Czech
Republic. It is a set of 13 different malware traffic captures which includes
normal, malware and background traffic. Each malware traffic was captured by
executing the malware in a Windows virtual machine and recording the network
traffic on that host. The normal traffic corresponds to network traffic which
was captured on normal hosts, i.e. hosts which weren’t infected with malware.
We will only be using only normal and malware traffic which are stored in pcap
files.
• Malware Capture Facility Project [25]
This research project is also carried out at Czech Technical University ATG
Group to capture, analyze and publish long-lived real malware network traffic.
The dataset was contributed by Maria Jose Erquiaga. The malware was executed
with two restrictions: a bandwidth limit and spam interception. The most
important characteristic of this project is the execution of malware during long
periods of time, that can go up to several months. The traffic is stored in pcap
files, labeled and made public for the research community
The entire dataset consists of total 72 captures out which 59 are malware captures
and 13 are benign captures. Table 1 gives us basic statistics about our dataset.

6

Table 1: Dataset Statistics
Total Number of connection 4-tuples
Number of normal 4-tuples
Number of malware 4-tuples
Total number of flows
Normal flows
Malware flows

3.1

61726
8828
52898
1136631
69358
1067273

Data Structure
Each dataset contains a pcap file of the capture, list of infected and normal hosts

and Bro IDS logs generated using the pcap files. Bro [26] is a powerful open-source
network analysis and intrusion detection tool. It supports various network analysis
features traffic inspection, log recording, attack detection, etc. We use Bro to generate
various network traffic logs which describe the network flow information and other
metadata. This information is then used to extract various features about the traffic
flow and use the those features to train and test machine learning models. Bro
generates various log files but we are mainly interested on the following three log files:
1. conn.log : It contains information about TCP, UDP and ICMP connections.
2. ssl.log: It contains information about SSL/TLS certificates and sessions.
3. x509.log: It contains information about X.509 certificates.
3.2

Feature Extraction
We extracted several features from the Bro logs generated using the network

captures. Features related to a single connection is spread over different log files.
For example, if we have an SSL connection to some server, the connection features
such as source, destination IP addresses, ports, protocols, connection duration, etc.
are stored in connection log (conn.log). The SSL features such as cipher used, server
7

name, etc. are stored in SSL log (ssl.log) and certificate features such as key lengths,
common names, validities, subjects, etc. are stored in certificate logs (x509.log).
Bro provides interconnection between various logs using unique keys. These unique
keys are common for a connection across different logs provided by Bro as shown in
Figure 1. Hence, an SSL connection will have the same unique key to identify the
record in connection and SSL logs. SSL has certificate ids to uniquely identify x509
certificates in certificate logs which were used in the SSL session or connection.

(a) conn.log

(b) ssl.log

(c) x509.log

Figure 1: Interconnection of log records using unique keys in Bro
Bro tracks every incoming and outgoing connection in conn.log. Every record
in the conn.log gives us information about a particular connection. Since we are
interested only in encrypted network connection, i.e. HTTPS, we only consider
connection records that are related to HTTPS connections. Since HTTPS connection
uses SSL/TLS to protocols to establish an encrypted link between the client and the
server, we only extract connection records which have corresponding entries in the
ssl.log file. This can be achieved by going through all the records in ssl.log file and
extracting corresponding connection records from the conn.log file.
Since, every SSL/TLS connection requires a server certificate to ensure credibility
of the server [27], every record in ssl.log contains one or more than one unique certificate
8

ids that the server offered to validate its signing chain. The unique certificate ids
represent the certificate record in the x509.log file. We extract only the first certificate
id from the ssl.log file since it corresponds to the end-user certificate. The remaining
ids correspond to intermediate and root certificates.
Every connection record can be identified by the 4-tuple of source IP address,
destination IP address, destination port and protocol. We use this 4-tuple as key to
aggregate network features. Hence every connection which has the same 4-tuple key
is grouped together. We then extract features from each group of connection records
which were aggregated in the previous step.
3.3

Features
We extracted some features based on [28, 29] from the connection, SSL and

certificate log files from Bro. Table 2 contains connection features extracted from
conn.log, Table 3 contains SSL features extracted from ssl.log and Table 4 contains
certificate features extracted from x509.log. All the features are computed over a
single connection 4-tuple aggregate of records.
3.4

Labels
The dataset from [24] and [25] contains IP addresses of infected and normal hosts.

We use these IP addresses to label our dataset accordingly. Hence, if a connection
record has an infected IP address either as source or destination then the record is
classified as malware else it is classified as benign.
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Table 2: Extracted features from conn.log
S.No
1

Feature Name
no_of_flows

2
3
4

avg_of_duration
standard_deviation_of_duration
percent_sd_of_duration

5
6
7

size_of_orig_flows
size_of_resp_flows
ratio_of_sizes

8

percent_of_established_conn

9
10
11
12

inbound_pckts
outbound_pckts
periodicity_average
periodicity_standart_deviation

10

Description
Number of aggregated records in connection
4-tuple
Mean duration of connections
Standard deviation of connections
Percentage of records with duration greater
than standard deviation
No. of bytes sent by the originator
No. of bytes sent by the responder
Ratio of responder bytes by all bytes transmitted
Percentage of established connections out
of all attempted connections
No. of incoming packets
No. of outgoing packets
Mean of periodicity of connection
Standard deviation of periodicity of connection

Table 3: Extracted Features from ssl.log
S.No
1
2
3

Feature Name
ssl_ratio
tls_version_ratio
SNI_ssl_ratio

4

self_signed_ratio

5

SNI_equal_DstIP

6
7

differ_SNI_in_ssl_log
differ_subject_in_ssl_log

8

differ_issuer_in_ssl_log

9

ratio_of_same_subjects

10

ratio_of_same_issuer

11
12

is_SNI_top_level_domain
ratio_missing_cert

Description
Ratio of SSL records to non-SSL records
Ratio of records with TLS
Ratio of connections having Server Name
Indication (SNI) in SSL record
Ration of connection with self signed certificates
1 if SNI is equal to destination IP in SSL
record
Ratio of SSL records with different SNI
Ratio of SSL records with different subjects
than certificate
Ratio of SSL records with different issuer
than certificate
Ratio of SSL records with same subject as
certificate
Ratio of SSL records with same issuer as
certificate
1 if SNI is a top level domain
Ratio of records with missing certificates
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Table 4: Extracted Features from x509.log
S.No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Feature Name
avg_key_len
avg_of_certificate_len
standart_deviation_cert_len
is_valid_certificate
amount_diff_certificates
no_of_domains_in_cert
certificate_ratio
no_of_cert_path
x509_ssl_ratio
is_SNIs_in_SAN_dns
is_CNs_in_SAN_dns

12
13
14
15
16
17

differ_subject_in_cert
differ_issuer_in_cert
differ_sandns_in_cert
is_same_CN_and_SNI
average_certificate_expo
ratio_certificate_path_error

Description
Average cipher key length
Average certificate length
Standard deviation of certificate length
1 if the certificate is valid during capture
No. of different certificates
No. of domains in certificates
Ratio of certificates validity time lengths
No. of signed certificates paths
Ratio of SSL logs with x509 certificates
Checks if SNI is SAN DNS
1 if all certificates have Comman Names in
SAN
Ratio of different subject in certificates
Ratio of different issuer in certificates
Ratio of different SAN DNS in certificates
Checks if CN is same as SNI
Average of certificate exponent
Checks if certificate path is valid
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CHAPTER 4
Methodolgy
An important part of any machine learning based detection technique is to choose
the most effective machine learning algorithm. For our experiments, we will use
various algorithms and try to find the one with the highest accuracy.
4.1

Machine Learning
Machine learning is a field of computer science that helps us automate the process

of learning from the data. It helps computers to learn and act without any human
intervention [30]. The process of learning from the data can be broadly divided into
two parts:
• Supervised Learning: In this the computer is given input data along with the
desired outputs and the aim is to learn a function that maps the input data to
the desired values.
• Unsupervised Learning: In this the computer is given only input data without
any labels or desired outputs and asked to either predict new data or classify
the given input data into separate classes.
In our research we labeled the input data as mentioned in Chapter 3 and thus
know if a particular connection is malicious or benign. Since we already know the
labels of the input data, we use supervised learning algorithms such as Support Vector
Machine (SVM), Random Forest, XGBoost and Deep learning based algorithms to
train our machine learning models on the input data.
4.1.1

Support Vector Machines

Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised learning algorithm that outputs
an optimal separating hyperplane given labeled training data. This hyperplane is
then used to classify new samples. The hyperplane is defined by a small subset of the
training the training data known as support vectors as shown in Figure 2.
13

Figure 2: SVM hyperplane and support vectors
SVM is based on the following three concepts:
• Margin Maximization: SVM maximizes the margin, i.e. the distance between
the support vectors to find the optimal hyperplane as shown in Fig 2
• Works in Higher Dimension Space: If the training data is not linearly separable,
SVM maps the input data to a higher dimensional feature space in which the
data is linearly separable as shown in Figure 3.
• Kernel Trick: While maximizing the separation margin we do not need the exact
points in the higher dimension feature space, but need only their inner products.
Getting the inner product is much easier than getting actual points in a higher
dimension space. The Kernel trick helps us to operate in a high-dimensional
feature space without computing the coordinates of the input data in feature
space.
One of the advantages of SVM is its effectiveness in high dimensional spaces such
as our own data where we have 41 features. Hence, it was a primary choice for our
experiments.

14

Figure 3: SVM maps input data to feature space
4.1.2

Random Forest

Random Forest is a supervised learning algorithm that is used in classification
and regression. It builds an ensemble of decision trees and merges them together to
get a stable and more accurate prediction [31]. As seen in Figure 4 [32], Random
Forest uses bootstrap aggregation also known as bagging to combine predictions from
multiple decision trees together to make a more accurate prediction. This reduces the
variance of the model without increasing the bias.

Figure 4: Random Forest
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Random Forest is created using the following steps:
1. ’K’ features are randomly selected from a total of ’m’ features such that K<< m
2. Using the ’K’ features a decision tree node is selected using the best split point.
3. The selected node is further split into child nodes using the best split.
4. Steps 1-3 are repeared until number of nodes is 1.
5. Decision tree forest is build by repeating Steps 1-4 for ’n’ number of times
As shown in Figure 4, the algorithm follows steps mentioned below to predict
the class of the test sample.
1. It takes the features of the test sample and goes through each decision tree to
predict the outcome.
2. Calculates the number of votes for each predicted class.
3. Declares the highest voted class as the final prediction.
4.1.3

XGBoost

XGBoost (eXtreme gradient boosting) is a relatively new software library which
was initially started by Tianqi Chen [33, 34] as a research project. It is based upon
gradient boosting which is an old machine learning technique used for regression
and classification. Like Random Forest, gradient boosting technique also outputs an
ensemble of weak decision trees as a prediction model.
Gradient boosting and Random Forest both use ensemble methods, i.e. building a
strong classifier from many weak classifiers. But, the fundamental difference between
the two algorithms lies in the methods used to build the strong classifier. Gradient
boosting builds on weak classifier sequentially, i.e. one classifier is added at a time
16

which improves upon the already trained ensemble. Whereas in Random Forest
bagging is used to create a large number of weak classifiers in parallel, i.e. the classifier
is trained independently from the rest.
In mathematical terms, if the ensemble has three trees, the prediction model can
be given as
D(x) = dtree1 (x) + dtree2 (x) + dtree3 (x)
According to gradient boosting the next tree would improve upon the already trained
ensemble by minimizes the training error. Thus, the new model D0 (x) can then be
given as
4.1.4

D0 (x) = D(x) + dtree4 (x)

Cross-Validation

Cross-validation is a technique to evaluate how machine learning models perform
on a given dataset. It is mainly used in situations such as ours where there is not
enough data to divide the dataset into separate training and testing sets. Cross
validation can be divided into two types:
• Exhaustive cross-validation: In this cross-validation method we learn and test
on all possible combinations of the training and testing set.
– Leave-p-out: Leave-p-out is a type of exhaustive cross-validation where we
use p sets as validation set and the remaining are used as training set.
• Non-exhaustive cross-validation: In this cross-validation method we do not
compute all possible combinations of the training and testing set.
– Holdout method: This is the simplest cross-validation method where the
dataset is separated into two sets, the training and testing set.
– k -fold cross-validation: In this cross-validation method we divide the
dataset into k subsets and then the model is iteratively tested on one set
and trained on the remaining set.
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We use 10-fold cross-validation in all our experiments. As shown in Figure 5, our
dataset is divided into ten subsets and the model is then iteratively trained on nine
subsets and tested on one subset.

Figure 5: 10-fold cross-validation. The red rectangle is the testing set and the other
subsets are used for training.

4.2

Evaluation Metrics
We use accuracy as our evaluation method for all the experiments. Accuracy is

used to measure how well the model could detect malicious network traffic among the
dataset. Accuracy can be defined as:
Accuracy =

TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN

where,
TP: True Positives
TN: True Negatives
FP: False Positives
FN: False Negatives
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CHAPTER 5
Experiments
This chapter discusses the various experiments conducted on the dataset and
their results. We will first go through techniques used to train various models and
then the metrics used to compare the results.
5.1

Training Experiments
As mentioned in Chapter 3, we don’t have a balanced dataset. The number

of malware samples are much greater than the benign samples. Due to this, we
use cross-validation technique to train and test our machine learning models on our
imbalanced dataset.
5.2

Data Analysis
As seen in Figure 6, initial data analysis reveals that the most frequent ports in

malware captures are different than the most frequent ports in the benign captures.
Similar result can be seen in Figure 7 which is a plot of the port number frequencies
used by the responding endpoint in the network traffic capture. The top 5 ports with
the highest frequency in both the captures are shown in Table 5 and Table 6.
As we can see from Table 5 and Table 6, malware dataset had Internet Relay
Chat (IRC) port among the most frequently used. We know that most of the malware
use IRC to exfiltrate data from the infected system to other systems. We also see that
HTTPS port 443 is also among the most frequently used in the malware captures.
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Figure 6: Frequency of ports used by ORIG
Table 5: Top Five Ports Used by ORIG
Dataset
Malware

Benign

5.3

Port Number
2077
2079
1025
137
3
5353
135
62078
137
138

Known Port Assignments
WebDisk or Old Tivoli Storage
IDWARE Router Port
Ports > 1024 are designated for dynamic
allocation by Windows
File and Print Sharing under Windows
Compression Process
Multicast DNS, iChat, Mac OS X Bonjour
Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
UPnP (Universal Plug and Play), iTunes
File and Print Sharing under Windows
File and Print Sharing under Windows

K-means Clustering
K-means clustering is an unsupervised learning algorithm that aims to partition n

data points into k clusters. Clustering is used to see whether the data points naturally
form distinct clusters or whether they are similar to other data points in the dataset.
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Figure 7: Frequency of ports used by RESP
We normalized the values in our dataset and performed K-means clustering with
k = 2. The results are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 below.
As seen in Figure 8, K-means didn’t really give us distinct clusters. Also , most of
the scatter plots based on connection features resemble that in Figure 9. We further
perform experiments using Support Vector Machine (SVM) and univariate feature
analysis to find prominent features in the dataset.
Also, after initial analysis three features were found to be constant throughout the dataset. These features are SNI_equal_DstIP, certificate_ratio and ratio_missing_cert_in_cert_path and were thus removed from our dataset.
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Table 6: Top Five Ports Used by RESP
Dataset
Malware

Benign

Port Number
25
443
53
80
6667
53508
49153
1900
53
5355

Known Port Assignments
SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol)
HTTPS / SSL - encrypted web traffic
DNS (Domain Name Service)
Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
IRC (Internet Relay Chat)
Xsan Filesystem Apple
ANTLR, ANother Tool for Language
Recognition
IANA registered by Microsoft for SSDP
(Simple Service Discovery Protocol)
DNS (Domain Name Service)
Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution
Windows
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Figure 8: Original Scatter Plot vs K-means clustering
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Figure 9: Original Scatter Plots with different axes

5.4

Experiments
This section states multiple experiments conducted using various machine learning

techniques and discusses the results.
5.4.1

SVM with 10-fold cross validation

In this experiment we ran SVM with linear kernel and 10-fold cross validation on
our dataset and achieved an average accuracy rate of 92.06% as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: SVM with 10-fold cross-validation
SVM also assigns weights to the input features which provided an insight into the
features SVM believes are important. In Figure 11, we can see that SVM assigned the
highest weight to feature number 16 which is the average certificate length. Table 7
provides us the rank assigned to each feature by SVM. We can see that average
certificate length, periodicity and average public key length are the top most features.
Also from [29] we know that malware use weak encryption techniques such as shorter
key lengths and are more periodic in nature than other applications. Also, the validity
of certificate during capture is the sixth highest rank feature which tell us that most
24

of malware may not have a valid certificate.

Figure 11: Weights assigned to features by SVM
5.4.2

SVM with different kernels

In this experiment SVM was trained on the dataset using different kernels such
as radial basis function (RBF) and polynomial kernel. The 10-fold cross validation
accuracy achieved using different kernels is shown in Figure 12. We can see that all
the kernels give us similar accuracy to that of the linear kernel.
5.4.3

Univariate Feature Elimination

After getting the feature ranks from SVM, we also performed univariate feature
elimination (UFE) to see if the feature ranks provided by SVM matches that of UFE.
We ran UFE with 10-fold cross-validation and plot the ranks along with SVM ranks.
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Table 7: Top 20 Feature ranks by SVM
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Feature
average_of_certificate_length
periodicity_standard_deviation
periodicity_average
standart_deviation_cert_length
average_public_key
is_valid_certificate_during_capture
average_of_duration
standard_deviation_duration
self_signed_ratio
SNI_ssl_ratio
ratio_of_differ_sandns_in_cert
percent_of_established_states
number_of_certificate_path
ratio_of_differ_subject_in_cert
ratio_of_differ_subject_in_ssl_log
tls_version_ratio
is_SNI_in_top_level_domain
total_size_of_flows_orig
ratio_of_sizes
ratio_of_differ_issuer_in_ssl_log

As seen in Figure 13, the weight rankings of UFE is almost similar to that of SVM.
5.4.4

SVM with Recursive Feature Elimination

After confirming the SVM feature ranks with that of UFE, we used Recursive
Feature Elimination (RFE) with SVM and 10-fold cross-validation to remove weak
features and calculate the accuracy. RFE iteratively eliminates one feature at a time
and calculates the accuracy until just one feature remains.
As we can see from Figure 14, we get within a 2% of the best result with just 6
features and within 1% with 10 features out of 41. It shows that the top 6 features in
Table 5 contribute the most to the accuracy of the model.

26

Figure 12: SVM with different kernels
5.4.5

Random Forest

In this experiment we ran Random Forest Classifier with Recursive Feature
Elimination and 10-fold cross-validation on the dataset to support the results given
by SVM in previous section. We also ran Random Forest Classifier with different
number of estimators to find the minimum number of estimators required to achieve
a higher accuracy.
The first observation from Figure 15 is that Random Forest gives us a much
higher accuracy than SVM. Also from Figure 16, we can see that the top 5 features
from Random Forest is not the same as SVM. This is because the Random Forest
uses an ensemble of trees where each tree is built using a random selection of features
and the nodes of each tree in the forest is built by selecting and splitting the node to
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Figure 13: Weights assigned to the features by SVM and UFE
achieve lowest variance [32]. This method of fitting the model on the dataset is very
different as compared to that of SVM.
Figure 17 shows that the accuracy increases when the number of estimators are
increased from 1 to 50 but becomes constant after that and remains the same even
after adding a total of 1000 estimators to the model.
5.4.6

XGBoost

In this experiment we ran XGBoost with Recursive Feature Elimination and
10-fold cross-validation. We also ran XGBoost with different number of estimators to
find the minimum number of estimators required to achieve the highest accuracy.
Figure 18 gives us a similar plot as compared to both SVM and Random Forest
which confirms that accuracy achieved using only the top ten features is almost equal
to the highest accuracy. From Figure 19, we can see that the top 10 features ranked
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Figure 14: Recursive Feature Elimination with SVM
by XGBoost is different from both Random Forest and SVM. This is because in
boosting the learning is done in a serial way and the feature importance is measured
by number of times a feature is used to split the data across trees.
Also from Figure 17, we can see that the accuracy increases as the number of
estimators are increased from 1 to 1000. The accuracy then remains constant for more
than 1000 estimators. It also shows that we can achieve an accuracy of more than
93%, which is within 7% of the highest accuracy, using only one estimator.
We can also see that XGBoost gives us the highest accuracy of 99.15% followed by
Random Forest which gives us an accuracy of 98.78. Thus, we can say that ensemble
techniques such as XGBoost and Random Forest performs the best on the given
dataset and can be used to identify malicious encrypted traffic.
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Figure 15: Recursive Feature Elimination with Random Forest
5.4.7

Classification based on malware family

In these experiments, four families of malware, i.e. Dridex, Trickbot, WannaCry
and Zbot were used to train the machine learning models from the previous experiments.
These models were then used to classify the encrypted malicious traffic based on the
malware family. Six set of training data was generated by taking permutations of two
malware families together which were labeled distinctly. For example, considering
Dridex and Trickbot, the encrypted network traffic generated by the malware belonging
to the Dridex was labeled separately than the traffic generated by the malware
belonging to the Trickbot family. Similarly we take permutations of two malware
families to create the six sets of training data.
Table 8 gives an overview of the four malware family dataset. Gathered flows the
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Figure 16: Random Forest feature importance
are number of connections made whereas the connection 4-tuples is the aggregated
form of the flows where every connection with same source and destination IP, port
and protocol are grouped together as mentioned in Chapter 3.
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Figure 17: Random Forest with different number of estimators
Table 8: Malware Family Dataset

Connection 4-tuples
Gathered Flows

Dridex
24
65465

Trickbot
217
465289

WannaCry
34
785

Zbot
45
1788

From Figure 22, we can see that Random Forest performs better than both SVM
and XGboost for each training set whereas XGBoost gives us a higher accuracy only
for the classification of Dridex from Trickbot. We can also see that the accuracy
gained by the three machine learning algorithms are within 3% of each other and can
be used to classify malware based on their families.
We also trained the models using dataset from all the four families together.
Each flow was labeled distinctly based on malware family that generated that specific
network traffic flow. This dataset was then used to train and test the machine learning
models. From Figure 23, we can see that Random Forest performs better than both
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Figure 18: XGBoost with Recursive Feature Elimination
SVM and XGBoost as seen in earlier experiments. We can also see from previous
experiments that SVM and Random Forest perform better in multi-class classification
problem as compared to when they were used to classify malicious traffic from benign.
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Figure 19: XGBoost feature importance
5.5

Discussion
As seen in Figure 24, XGBoost performs better than other algorithms. We get an

area under the curve (AUC) value of 0.9988 for XGBoost, whereas SVM and Random
Forest achieve an AUC of 0.9122 and 0.998 respectively. Thus the highest accuracy
gained in our approach is 99.88% which is the same as that achieved by Anderson
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Figure 20: XGBoost with different number of estimators

Figure 21: Performance comparison of the three machine learning algorithms
and McGrew in [21]. We achieved a constant higher accuracy for different malware
samples than the other related work mentioned in Chapter 2 [16, 18, 20]. As seen in
Figure 25, length of the encryption key, certificate length, TLS version and certificate
validity are highly correlated with other features and are also the most prominent
features selected by both SVM and UFE in the above experiments. This result is also
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Figure 22: Performance comparison of the three machine learning algorithms for
malware family based classification
supported by research carried out by Anderson and McGrew in [35]. In Figure 25,
we can see the correlation between features and also see that periodicity, certificate
length and key length are highly correlated to other features. Also from Figure 22, we
can see that these machine learning algorithms can be further used successfully to
solve the multi-class problem where we try to classify the encrypted network traffic
based on the malware family.
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Figure 23: Performance comparison of the three machine learning algorithms for
multi-class problem

Figure 24: Comparison of various machine learning algorithms
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Figure 25: Feature correlation heat map
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
6.1

Conclusion
With an increase in worldwide adoption of HTTPS and advancement in malware

detection techniques, we will see an increase in the number of malware samples
using HTTPS and encryption to evade detection and hide their malicious activity. It
is worrying because encryption interferes with the traditional detection techniques.
Identifying such threats in a way that is feasible, fast and does not compromise user
security is an important problem. Machine learning methods have been proven to
overcome traditional limitations and can be used to train models on malware network
traffic data. These models can then be used to detect similar malicious network traffic
and flag a system for malware infection. Further, the system can be isolated to prevent
further propagation of malware on the internal network.
The primary motivation of this research is the challenging problem of classifying
encrypted network traffic as malicious or benign without using any decryption or deep
packet inspection. In this research, we used several machine learning algorithms such
as SVM, XGBoost, random forest to classify malicious and non-malicious encrypted
network traffic. These algorithms were used to train and test models which can be
used for classification. The results show that XGBoost performed better than other
algorithms and reached the highest accuracy of 99.15%. We also achieved a high
accuracy using only top six or top 10 features from Table 7. The results also support
that machine learning models can be used to solve the multi-class problem. Thus,
we can conclude that encrypted malware network traffic is distinct from the normal
traffic and it also differ from one malware family to another. This property can be
used to successfully identify an infected host and also specify the malware family with
which the host was infected.
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6.2

Future Work
There is a lot of scope to further improve the accuracy in future work. The

next step would be to collect more data for training and testing the models and find
additional features that could be useful in classification. Obtaining public network
captures is harder due to the privacy issues involved. Thus, future work might include
setting up a lab to generate both malicious as well as non-malicious network captures.
The malicious network captures can be generated by running the latest malware
samples that are uploaded to VirusTotal [36] in a virtual environment and recording
the network traffic. Another step in data collection would be to collect more data
from malware samples belonging to the same malware family. An interesting direction
might be to try tools other than Bro to extract novel features and use them to try
additional machine learning algorithms. Lastly, the future work might also include
deploying the model on a real-world network to test the performance and robustness
of the proposed approach.
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